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ABSTRACT
In Safe Harbor for the Innocent Infringer in the Digital Age (Safe
Harbor), I argued that certain classes of direct innocent infringers of
copyright—namely, accidental and mea culpa infringers1—should be
afforded safe harbor from liability in light of current accepted online practices
of users deemed essential for the proper functioning and progress of the
Internet and digital technology. I offered a statutory amendment to Section
512 of the Copyright Act, one that would apply specifically to direct users
and protect them in ways similar to the protections currently available to
online service providers.
In this Article, I approach the same topic from the damages phase and
argue that a user’s actual or constructive knowledge of a copyright
holder’s rights should be a factor in determining whether the holder’s
damages award should be limited to the currently discretionary minimum
award. Knowledge could even serve to create a presumption of culpability
during the damages phase after liability has been determined.2 However,
notice of copyright alone should not serve as a complete bar to a defendant’s
ability to assert an innocent infringement defense that triggers a minimum

1. I coined the terms “accidental infringer” and “mea culpa infringer” in Safe
Harbor. Tonya M. Evans, “Safe Harbor” for the Innocent Infringer in the Digital Age,
50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 15 (2013). R. Anthony Reese explains the concept underlying
the term in his comprehensive coverage of the innocent infringer defenses in Innocent
Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 133–34 (2007).
Reese explains: “[i]nnocent or unknowing copyright infringement occurs when someone
engages in infringing activity not knowing that her conduct constitutes infringement—
perhaps most commonly when she knowingly copies from another’s work but reasonably
believes that her copying is not infringing.” Id. at 133.
2. Copyright infringement is a strict liability offense. See infra Part II (explaining
and critiquing the strict liability nature of copyright). Thereafter, a court assesses a defendant’s
culpability to determine, in its discretion, what amount of statutory damages is appropriate:
ordinary damages ($750–$30,000), increased damages for willful infringement (up to
$150,000) or a minimal damages for innocent infringement (not more than $250). 17
U.S.C. § 504(1), (2) (2012). The distinction between liability and culpability is important.
Nolo.com defines liability as, “the state of being liable—that is, legally accountable for an
act or omission.” It defines culpability as being “[s]ufficiently responsible for criminal acts or
negligence to be at fault and liable for the conduct.” The latter focuses on the user’s state
of mind while engaged in the infringing activity.
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statutory damage award. This approach is fairer and more just, especially
in light of the fact that copyright infringement is a strict liability offense
and exposes even the ordinary, low-level infringer to damage awards that
are often questioned by commentators and judges alike as egregious and,
in some cases, unconstitutional.3
Accordingly, I argue that in lieu of—or in addition to—my user safe
harbor proposal in Safe Harbor, Congress should adopt a more meaningful
minimum statutory damage award under Section 504(c) for certain classes
of noncommercial infringement and commercial infringement causing little
or no economic harm. This proposal would apply in cases where liability
is established and the use is not otherwise legally permitted or excused.4
It would reduce statutory damage awards for technically infringing uses
that support progress because they are socially beneficial, technologically
desirable, or both..5
In light of the Department of Commerce’s 2016 Internet Policy Task
Force report on statutory damages and the Copyright Office Section 512
Roundtables on the same topic, I discuss the report’s findings, as well as
Canada’s approach to user rights for illustrative purposes, against the
backdrop of my own recommendations.
I. INTRODUCTION
As John Tehranian and countless commentators have so aptly proclaimed,
“[i]n the digital age, we are all regular consumers and producers of
copyrighted content.”6 Without question, we are firmly entrenched in the
“Participation Age,” and content consumers are no longer passive in their

3. See infra Part II (critiquing excessive statutory damages awards and lack of clear
legislative or judicial standards in determining amounts).
4. Essentially, user “safer harbor” would be triggered to reduce the damages award
to “innocent infringement” levels for technically infringing but socially and technologically
beneficial activities. See infra Part III.
5. I use the terms “technically” or “technical” to refer to incidental uses that are
not authorized by the copyright holder.
6. John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm
Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 540. Tehranian articulated three observations:
First, copyright law is increasingly relevant to the daily life of the average
American. Second, this growing pertinence has precipitated a heightened public
consciousness over copyright issues. Finally, these two facts have magnified
the vast disparity between copyright law and copyright norms and, as a result,
have highlighted the need for reform.
Id. at 539.
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consumption.7 However, when someone uses a copyrighted work in ways
protected by Section 106 of the Copyright Act8 without permission or
legal excuse, such use is considered a copyright infringement. Those uses
include reproduction, publication, public display, public performance, and
adaptation.9
Modern copyright consumers have unprecedented access to copyrighted
works via the Internet and opportunities to exploit them in digital form.
However misguided, these consumers—especially many “digital natives”10
—have an expectation that works accessed online can be adapted, repurposed
and remixed without legal consequence.11
Due to the strict liability nature of copyright, innumerable technical
copyright infringements occur online every day,12 even when users are
engaging in online practices many would consider acceptable, welcomed,
and even essential to the proper functioning of the Internet.13 Those technical
infringements can cause even the average consumer of copyrighted works
to wind up in court to defend their use.14 And, in light of the vast range

7. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 263 (2006) (explaining that
users have abandoned the consumptive and passive aspects of the “Information Age,” “to
embrace the ‘Participation Age’ of remix culture, blogs, podcasts, wikis, and peer-to-peer
filesharing.”) (citations omitted).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
9. Id.
10. See Marc Prensky, Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants Part 1, 9 ON HORIZON
1 (2001). In coining the term “digital natives,” Prensky discussed the ubiquitous presence
technology has in the lives of the younger generation, stating:
[They] represent the first generations to grow up with this new technology. They
have spent their entire lives surrounded by and using computers, videogames,
digital music players, video cams, cell phones, and all the other toys and tools
of the digital age . . . Computer games, email, the Internet, cell phones, and
instant messaging are integral parts of their lives.
Id.; see also JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 4–7 (2008).
11. See infra Parts II and III (exploring user expectations, concerns and commonplace
and generally accepted online activities).
12. See infra Part IV, which details user activities that could trigger a reduced damages
award.
13. See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1841
(2000) (“All of this activity arguably infringes the copyright holder’s exclusive rights of
reproduction and distribution. [However, only one case] supports this result.” (first citing
17 U.S.C. § 106; and then citing Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552
(M.D. Fla. 1993))).
14. The most common defenses, other than the innocent infringer defense include:
copyright invalidity as to originality, whether the work is the proper subject matter of
copyright, ownership, de minimis use, fair use; and independent creation. Evans, supra
note 1, at 12 n.39.
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of permissible damage awards within the statutory damages15 framework
and almost unfettered judicial discretion in determining a use to be innocent,
ordinary, or willful infringement, many users would be surprised to learn
that their unauthorized use could lead to civil damage awards ranging from
$750 to $30,000 for ordinary infringement,16 and up to $150,000 for willful
infringement.17
A user who neither knew nor should have known her use was infringing—
aka the innocent infringer18—could, in a court’s discretion, only be required
to pay a reduced damages amount of $200 per work infringed.19 The
Copyright Act provides, however, that where visually perceptible copies20
or phonorecords21 of sound recordings are concerned, a defendant will not
qualify for minimum damages if the defendant had access to a physical
copy of the infringed work bearing a proper copyright notice. In the case
of certain digital works that are not visually perceptible, the “access”
determination can be problematic.22 If a properly affixed copyright notice
appears on a physical copy of the infringed digital work, courts have held
that the digital user is precluded from invoking the innocent infringer
argument necessary to qualify for the reduced statutory damages award.23
In that case, the user is deemed to have constructive notice even if she did
not have actual notice via access to a physical copy.

15. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2) (2012). Statutory damages and attorney’s fees are available
only if the work is timely registered by the plaintiff with the Copyright Office prior to the
infringement or within three months of publication. 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (2012).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). Unfortunately, the term “willful” is not defined
in the Act and no examples are offered to provide additional guidance.
18. An innocent infringer “is a defendant who infringes a copyright without intending
to do so and without having a reason to suspect that she is doing so.” Jacqueline D. Lipton,
Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and Innocent Copyright Infringement, 13 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 767, 772–73 (2011) (citing Alan Lautman & William S. Tager, Liability of Innocent
Infringers of Copyrights, reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A., STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT (1963)).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 401(d) (2012).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2012).
22. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2005). In Gonzalez,
the court held that the “access” requirement is met when one has literal access to copies
with the required copyright notice. Id. For digital cases involving works that were not
visually perceptible, see Electra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. McDowell, 4:06-CV-115 (CDL),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82208, at *2 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (applying § 401(d)), and Maverick
Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying § 402(d)).
23. Lipton, supra note 18, at 781.
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In Safe Harbor,24 I argued that certain classes of technical online
infringers should be classified as innocent infringers and afforded safe
harbor from copyright liability in light of current accepted online practices
of users deemed essential for the proper functioning and progress of the
Internet and digital technology. In that article, I offered a statutory
amendment to Section 512 of the Copyright Act, one that would apply
specifically to users and protect them as if they were online service
providers.25
Even if Congress does not adopt my user safe harbor proposal, it could
still address and remedy the aforementioned concerns in Section 504,
which contains the statutory damages provisions.26 Congress could extend
“innocent infringer”-level damages to a broader class of infringers. The
innocent infringer defense currently applies only to users who neither
knew nor should have known of the copyright holder’s copyright interests.27
Under my proposal, this broader class of users could qualify for minimal
damages even if they have constructive notice of an owner’s copyright
claim. Minimal damages would be available for users who engage in
accidental or mea culpa online infringement behavior considered commonplace
and ordinary and who, once notified, take expeditious steps to cease the
infringing activity.28 Contemplated activities include noncommercial uses or
those that cause little or no economic harm, and users who, once notified,
take all reasonable measures to end the infringing activity.29
Accordingly, in this Article I argue that notice of copyright should only
be a factor to be considered in determining whether the user may qualify
as an innocent infringer and, therefore, whether the copyright holder is
limited to reduced damages. Notice, however, should not completely bar
a defendant from raising the innocent infringer argument under certain
circumstances outlined in my proposed amendment.30
To be sure, this amendment would be a significant departure from
current law as far as the impact of an infringer’s knowledge of the owner’s
copyright interests is concerned. And to be clear, knowledge would certainly

24. Evans, supra note 1, at 2.
25. Id.
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
27. Lipton, supra note 18, at 781.
28. See infra Part VI that outlines 504(c)(3) and 512 “reimagined.”
29. This approach to damages is particularly sound given the law’s long history of
applying the common law maxim de minimis non curat lex; that is, “the law cares not for
trifles.” See Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992)
(stating the maxim is “part of the established background of legal principles against which
all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary indication) are
deemed to accept”).
30. See infra Part VI.
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have probative value in the damages calculation—as currently assessed
under 504(c).31 I argue, however, that notice alone should not serve as a
complete bar to a minimum statutory damage award. This result seems
both reasonable and just given that (1) notice is not required for rights to
exist; and (2) copyright is a strict liability offense that exposes even the ordinary,
low-level infringer to damage awards questioned by commentators and
judges alike as sometimes egregious and, in some cases, unconstitutional.
Accordingly, in this Article, I offer a statutory amendment to Section
504 to resolve the copyright liability and remedy proportionality concerns.
Specifically, I argue that in lieu of—or in addition to—a user safe harbor
proposal, Congress could also adopt a more robust and meaningful minimum
statutory damage award under 504(c) beyond innocent infringers for certain
classes of noncommercial infringement and commercial infringement that
results in negligible economic harm. This “safer harbor” proposal could
apply when the proposed user safe harbor is not applied to technically
infringing activity deemed socially beneficial or technologically desirable
to support progress, or both. To be sure, limits on statutory damages are
desirable even outside of the innocent infringement context.
I believe the entire statutory damage scheme should be reformed and
brought more in line with fair and just results required by the Act, as is
typical and necessary in strict liability offenses across legal disciplines.32
To this end, my proposal seeks to: (1) create a mandatory, rather than
discretionary, reduced damage award for a certain class of infringers; and
(2) expand the types of activities that might trigger innocent infringementlike protection of defendants during the remedies phase of the infringement
lawsuit.
In Part II, I examine copyright’s failure in form and application in both
the copyright liability and damages phases of an infringement suit. I critique
the strict liability nature of copyright, excessive discretionary damage awards,
the lack of clear judicial standards in determining the type of infringement—
innocent, ordinary, or willful—and amount of damages due, the role of the
copyright notice on physical copies as a complete bar to innocent infringement
in digital copyright cases, and the lack of a viable innocent infringement
defense in practice.33
31. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
32. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright
Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009), for a discussion
of this principle.
33. See infra Part II.
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In Part III, I explore user concerns in making ex ante determinations
about what qualifies as a public domain work, substantial similarity, fair
use, and “grey areas” of copyright law where the laws are unclear in form,
in application, or in both—especially tolerated uses.34 The main concerns
in this area are: the absence of copyright formalities intended to give users
adequate notice of plaintiff’s rights, the need for dramatically increased
access for average users, the considerable risk of liability in the online
environment, and the stiff penalties awaiting users who guess incorrectly.
In Part IV, I explore the types of modern-day, commonplace, and generally
accepted uses—both commercial and noncommercial—that should trigger
only minimal damages. I also examine Canada’s Copyright Modernization
Act (CMA),35 which creates new personal use and fair dealing exceptions
for creation of non-commercial user-generated content (the UGC-mashup
exception),36 reproduction of protected works for a private purpose (the
format-shifting exception),37 and fixation of signals and recording programs
for later listening or viewing (the “time-shifting” exception).38
In Part V, I explore the 2016 Department of Commerce’s Internet Policy
Task Force report on statutory damages and unpack the report’s findings
against the backdrop of my own recommendations to amend Section 504.
A re-imagined Section 504 provides mandatory “safer harbor” protection
for accidental and mea culpa infringers from the more onerous and excessive
statutory damages awards currently being applied.
Finally, in Part VI, I propose language that Congress could adopt to amend
Section 504. Ultimately, my goal is to ensure that minimum statutory
damages awards are more real than theoretical in the digital age for accidental
and mea culpa infringers, and to expand the types of activities that might
trigger innocent infringement-style protection during the remedies phase
of the infringement suit.
II. FAILURES IN COPYRIGHT’S FORM AND APPLICATION
The constitutional justification for the copyright monopoly is that, by
providing authors with an economic incentive to create and disseminate
creative works, the public will reap the benefits of progress from creative

34. YouTube content ID is an excellent example of the option copyright owners
have to monetize infringing activity rather than issuing a takedown request to remove the
material from YouTube. For a full explanation of Content ID, visit https://www.youtube.
com/yt/copyright/ [https://perma.cc/E54P-3NXH].
35. Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c.20 (Can.).
36. Copyright Act of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-42 § 29.21.
37. Id. § 29.22.
38. Id. § 29.23.
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and inventive endeavors.39 Limitations on copyright, like excepting certain
users—libraries and non-profit organizations, for example—from liability
and the fair use doctrine, inject balance into the constitutional equation
and prevent exclusive rights from stifling creativity.40
A. Strict Liability
On its face, the Copyright Act’s standard for copyright infringement appears
relatively straightforward: “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner” is liable for copyright infringement.41
Accordingly, anyone who uses a copyrighted work in ways reserved by
Section 106 to the work’s author without legal permission or excuse is
strictly liable for copyright infringement. From a liability perspective, the
Act treats all infringers alike—from the most unwitting to the most egregious.
In copyright’s strict liability scheme, the infringer’s intent is irrelevant in
determining liability.
Many commentators have criticized the strict liability framework, with
some wholly rejecting the assertion that copyright is a strict liability rule
at all.42 Critics suggest that a better approach to copyright liability would
be a conditional cause of action more akin to negligence.43 I tend to agree

39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and
Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1571 (2009) (stating that “[c]opyright law’s
principal justification today is the economic theory of creator incentives.”); Molly Shaffer
Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1539 (2005)
(explaining that “[t]he primary justification for U.S. copyright law is encouraging the creation
of expressive works that benefit the public.”).
40. See Van Houweling, supra note 39, at 1539. Professor Van Houweling explains:
“the ultimate aim is, by this [economic] incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.” Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012).
42. See, e.g., Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright a Strict Liability Tort, 30 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 305 (2015) (arguing that copyright infringement is not a strict liability tort, but
rather a fault-based tort); Steven Hetcher, The Kids Are Alright: Applying a FaultLiability Standard to Amateur Digital Remix, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1275 (2010) (arguing for a
fault liability regime for user-generated content); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberspace,
Exceptionalism, and Innocent Copyright Infringement, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. REV.
767 (2011) (offering ways in which the innocent infringement standard for damages could,
instead, result in no liability).
43. See Stanley F. Birch, Copyright Fair Use: A Constitutional Imperative, the 36th
Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 147 n.22 (2006)
(outlining three weaknesses of the analogy to real/personal property); Christina Bohannan,
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with the latter school of thought. Nonetheless, I assert that even under the
current strict liability approach, Congress should add additional exceptions to
liability findings (as I argued in Safe Harbor) or require that judges always
award minimum damages for the least culpable who qualify as accidental
and mea culpa infringers. Clearly, this would remove a certain level of judicial
discretion.44 On balance, however, I argue that this change is technologically
necessary, constitutionally just, objectively reasonable to both users and
owners, and therefore, ultimately beneficial to society.45
B. Inconsistent Statutory Damages Determinations
Copyright owners are entitled to compensation for economic harm to their
Section 106 rights.46 For owners who timely register their copyright, statutory
Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 974–76, 983–
85 (2007) (criticizing the use of trespass-to-land models in copyright).
44. See e.g., Jobete Music Co., Inc. v. Johnson Communications, Inc., 285 F. Supp.
2d 1077, 1086 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (explaining “[i]t is well-established that trial courts have
wide discretion in awarding damages within the statutory range provided in § 504(c)(1).”);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. DeGallo, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D.N.J. 1995) (noting “[t]he
district court has wide discretion as to the damages actually awarded” (citing Harris v.
Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984)).
45. One considerable benefit to society not often asserted is the value of social and
semiotic production. See Sunder, supra note 7, at 307–08 (noting that an economic incentive
rationale of copyright “fails to appreciate the value of semiotic democracy, a society in
which everyone may participate in the processes of cultural production and dialogue.”);
Tehranian, supra note 6, at 540 (2007). Tehranian explains that:
[c]opyright law is playing a profound role in shaping our very identities. Copyright’s
regulation, propertization, and monopolization of cultural content determine
who can draw upon such content in the discursive process of identity formation.
Thus, the contours of our intellectual property regime privilege certain individuals
and groups over others and intricately affect notions of belonging, political and
social organization, expressive rights, and semiotic structures.
Id.
46. Section 106 provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly
by means of a digital audio transmission.
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damages are available in lieu of actual damages.47 In fact, statutory damages
are available to a plaintiff regardless of the plaintiff’s ability to establish
actual damages, even for “uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright.”48
Statutory damages can compensate an aggrieved copyright owner when actual
damages are difficult or impossible to determine.49 And at the upper end of
the range, statutory damages may certainly have a deterrent effect.50 However,
judges regularly forego a substantive exercise of discretion and instead rely,
without much explanation, on statutory maximums for either ordinary or
willful infringement.51 Online infringement cases are hardly immune from
inconsistent results and may lead to even more wildly varied decisions.52
A court’s process of determining the amount of damages—without much
discussion or explanation—and the inconsistent results such cases bring
about, is well illustrated by the case of Macklin v. Mueck.53 In Macklin, the
plaintiff sued two individuals who displayed Macklin’s copyrighted work
on their poetry website.54 The defendants failed to respond to the complaint
and Macklin, in turn, moved for an award of the statutory maximum for
willful infringement.55 Despite the magistrate’s recommendation of $750
in damages per poem, the court found the unauthorized use to be willful,
and awarded the maximum statutory amount of $300,000—$150,000 per
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); see also Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Principles Project:
Directions for Reform, 25 B ERKELEY T ECH. L.J. 1175, 1220 (2010) (explaining that
“[c]opyright owners have long been entitled to be compensated for pecuniary harms that
infringement inflicts on them.”).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012); see also Samuelson, supra note 46, at 1221.
48. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 507 (1st Cir. 2011)
(citing F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952)).
49. See Samuelson, supra note 46, at 1221.
50. See id. (“[a]t the higher end of the scale, statutory damages are thought to provide
extra deterrence or punishment for egregious infringement.”).
51. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, 6 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:155, Westlaw (database
updated Sept. 2016); see also Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 32, at 441 (explaining
that “those who merely should have known their conduct was infringing are often treated
as willful infringers.”) (citation omitted).
52. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, No. 95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131, at *15
(E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996) (holding that defendant must pay the statutory minimum of $2,500
for posting considerable portions of five Scientology books to the internet). But see L.A.
Times v. Free Republic, No. 98-7840, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20484, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
14, 2000) (awarding plaintiff $1 million in statutory damages because defendant posted an
unspecified number of newspaper articles on its nonprofit website).
53. Macklin v. Mueck, No. 00-14092, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18026 (S.D. Fla. Jan.
28, 2005).
54. Id. at *3.
55. Id. at *2.
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work infringed.56 The court in Macklin seemingly chose to forego entirely
the subjective analysis and discretion that Congress intended a judge to
exercise. Additionally, the court failed to articulate a reason for its decision
to impose the maximum penalty. This result is just one example of many
and it reflects a troubling trend in need of reform.57
The history of statutory damages in the United States is as long as the
history of copyright itself. The first statutory damages provision was the
Statute of Anne, enacted by the Parliament of Great Britain in 1710.58
From the initial enactment in 1790 through the current iteration of the 1976
Act, statutory damages in the United States have existed as an alternate
compensatory remedy to actual damages, with the purpose of deterring future
infringements.59 The limits of statutory damage awards have changed over
the years since 1909, with the limits consistently increasing.60 Congress gave

56. Id. at *1.
57. It is not uncommon for courts to punt a substantive analysis of statutory damages
assessments due to a fundamental lack of understanding of copyright. For example, in one
case, the plaintiff was awarded $31,000 per infringed work after the defendant was found
to be willful in the unauthorized production of karaoke disks of the plaintiff’s music.
Zomba Enters. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 580 (6th Cir. 2007). The trial
court determined that once liability was established to be willful, the statutory damages
for non-willful infringement were insufficient. Id. at 580, 586. Professor Samuelson criticized
the decision because there was no apparent explanation to assess “the unusual figure of
$31,000 per work.” See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 32, at 483–84. Professors
Samuelson and Wheatland provide numerous examples of widely inconsistent statutory
damages awards in their essential work on the topic. Id. at 442–43 (first citing UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, No. 00 Civ. 472 (JSR), 2000 WL 1262568, at *1, *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 6, 2000) (involving a $118 million award ($25,000 per CD) “despite the absence of
any evidence of actual harm to the plaintiffs or profits to the defendant”); then citing
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284,
288 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d sub nom. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S.
340 (1998) (involving a jury award (court-awarded damages $20,000 per work, for a total
award of $8.8 million was increased by a jury on appeal to $72,000 per work “for exactly
the same acts of infringement, resulting in a total award of over $31 million”); and then
citing Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008)
(jury award of $80,000 per work infringed against a file-sharer, for a total award of over
$1.92 million, finding that actual damages were approximately $50.”)).
58. See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c.19 (Eng.), http://www.copyrighthistory.
com/anne.html [https://perma.cc/VP8L-39YZ] (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). The Act required
an infringer to pay one penny per infringing sheet, half of which went to the author and
the other half to the Crown. Id. § 1; see also Priscilla Ferch, Note, Statutory Damages
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 485, 487 (1984).
59. See Colin Morrissey, Note, Behind the Music: Determining the Relevant Constitutional
Standard for Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3059, 3066 (2010).
60. Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, Measure of Statutory Damages to Which
Copyright Owner is Entitled Under 17 USCS § 504(c), 105 A.L.R. Fed. 345, § 2[a] (1991).
Statutory damages are also referred to as “in lieu” damages. Id.
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judges wide discretion to determine the appropriate damages to reach more
“just” results.
Congress affords judges “wide and almost exclusive discretion” to determine
the amount of statutory damages—within the ranges set forth in the Act—
for innocent, ordinary, and willful infringement.61 In cases of ordinary or
willful infringement, however, due process concerns and the opportunity
for appellate review contemplate that a district court provide at least some
cursory explanation of the district court’s findings and reasoning in support
of its exercise of discretion.”62 As noted earlier, not all courts choose to
follow this sound expectation.
Congress chose to subject statutory remedies in copyright infringement
cases to judicial discretion as a means of furthering various policy
considerations.63 These policy considerations include just compensation,
unjust enrichment, inter-party fairness, and generally serving the public interest.
Congress deemed judicial discretion essential to ensure that adequate deterrents
were in place to discourage future infringing behaviors.64 In addition to
the deterrent effect, Congress sought to ensure that infringement cases ended
in a just result.65
61. Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing
Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)); see also Samuelson & Wheatland,
supra note 32, at 441. Professors Samuelson and Wheatland explain: “. . .copyright law
provides scant guidance about where in that range awards should be made, other than to
say that the award should be in an amount the court “considers just,” and that the upper
end of the spectrum . . . is reserved for “willful” infringers.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
62. Id.
63. See Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures
in Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2011).
64. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952).
The Court noted the following:
[A] rule of liability which merely takes away the profits from an infringement
would offer little discouragement to infringers. . . . The statutory rule, formulated
after long experience, not merely compels restitution of profit and reparation for
injury but also is designed to discourage wrongful conduct. The discretion of the
court is wide enough to permit a resort to statutory damages for such purposes.
Even for uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright the court may, if it
deems it just, impose a liability within statutory limits to sanction and vindicate
the statutory policy.
Id.
65. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012); see also H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 161–63 (1976)
(detailing the two basic aims of Section 504 as follows: “(1) to give the courts specific
unambiguous directions concerning monetary awards, thus avoiding the confusion and
uncertainty that have marked the present law on the subject, and, at the same time, (2) to
provide the courts with reasonable latitude to adjust recovery to the circumstances of the
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Wide deviations in judicial determinations of statutory damages occur
for a number of reasons. First, copyright law is woefully complex and
counterintuitive.66 Because of this complexity, court outcomes are hard
to predict.67 Second, the legal framework consists of open standards “whose
purpose is to permit the development, on a case-by-case basis, of finelytuned norms.”68 Facts-and-circumstances determinations to set the amount
of statutory damages, given this statutorily prescribed discretion, also lead
to varied and inconsistent results. Finally, the “all-or-nothing” approach
to liability, coupled with a lack of guidance about how to set statutory damage
awards, forces parties to a “settling result” rather than testing the bounds
of the law enacted to protect certain legally excused unauthorized uses.”69
When damages far exceed liability and bear no reasonable proportionality
to the copyright owner’s actual harm, such an unjust result can have unintended
negative consequences on otherwise beneficial activities, most notably a
chilling effect on copyright use.70
When legal outcomes are uncertain, rational parties gravitate toward the
least-risky or least-costly option.71 This tendency leads such parties to avoid
the copyrighted material altogether, creating a chilling effect on creativity
and fair use, which is contrary to the constitutional justification of the copyright
monopoly to spur progress.72 Therefore, Congress must reform the statutory
case, thus avoiding some of the artificial or overly technical awards resulting from the
language of the existing statute.”).
66. See Afori, supra note 63, at 2 (noting that such wide deviations lead to a chilling
effect on copyright users who engage in “risk-adverse” behavior and, as a result, either
avoid use altogether or seek to license works that may not actually necessitate a license);
Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 19 (1996)
(alluding to the “complex body of counterintuitive, bewildering rules[.]”); Pamela Samuelson,
Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law for the Information Age: Foreword
to a Symposium, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (discussing the difficulty in finding common
threads and establishing uniform rules in the copyright context).
67. Afori, supra note 63, at 2.
68. Id. at 5–6.
69. Id. at 3.
70. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873 (1998) (explaining that “if injurers are made to pay
more than for the harm they cause, wasteful precautions may be taken . . . and risky but
socially beneficial activities may be undesirably curtailed”).
71. See Afori, supra note 63, at 11.
72. See id. Afori explains that parties prefer settlements, despite their chilling effects on
creativity, because of, “the certainty they provide, in contrast to the uncertainty as to the
outcome of a trial verdict: since both parties are evaluating their legal chances under the
veil of ignorance, they rationally prefer the lesser potential harm of compromise.” Id.
(citing George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984)); see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Can Formalities Save the Public Domain?
Reconsidering Formalities for the 2010s, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1537, 1539 (2013)
(explaining that works of unknown authorship are underused because of “uncertainty about
whether they are protected by copyright or not, which creates a chilling effect”).
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damages provisions or at least give judges greater clarity to render fairer,
more consistent, and more just statutory damage award determinations.73
Congress intended judicial discretion in damages award determinations
to provide greater certainty and protection for those users who engaged in
non-injurious and beneficial but unauthorized uses of copyrighted material.74
Congress believed that by granting wide latitude in damages determinations,
it would better ensure that the “grey areas” of copyright could be addressed
on an as-needed basis, after considering the facts and circumstances of
each case.75 In practice, however, the wide deviations in interpretation and
application across the circuits have been anything but certain.76
C. Innocent Infringement & the Role of Access to Copies Bearing
“Notice” in Determining Statutory Damages in
Digital Cases
The innocent infringer defense finds its origins in England’s Statute of
Anne.77 The statute prohibited the unauthorized sale of copyrighted materials
and applied its penalty provisions to anyone who did so.78 The drafters of
the statute were concerned with the unintended but foreseeable consequences
of parties unknowingly violating the law due to ignorance of the law.79
Historically, then, copyright law shielded individuals who were unaware
that their actions infringed from the more onerous penalties that stem from
a strict liability offense.
73. Samuelson, supra note 46, at 1221. Professor Samuelson explains: “[i]f copyright
law is to retain the right to elect to recover statutory damages in lieu of actual damages,
guidelines for awarding statutory damages in a consistent, reasonable, and just manner should
be developed.” Id. at 1220.
74. H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 30–31 (1967) (discussing teachers, librarians, and other
non-profit users of copyrighted material).
75. See supra note 59.
76. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 32, at 485–86 (inviting the reader to compare
Peer International Corp. v. Luna Records, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 560, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1995),
with Peer International Corp. v. Max Music & Entertainment. Inc., No. 03 Civ. 0996, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12760, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2004), and Peer International Corp. v.
Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990)). In these cases, the same copyright
holder sued three different parties for essentially the same thing—continuing to make and
sell records after a compulsory license was terminated—and obtained statutory damages
in the three cases totaling $10,000, $30,000, and $50,000, respectively. Id. at 486.
77. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c.19 (Eng.), http://www.copyrighthistory.com/
anne.html [https://perma.cc/VP8L-39YZ] (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
78. Id. § 1.
79. Reese, supra note 1, at 145.
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It was the English drafters’ intent to minimize liability for copyright
infringement suffered by those without the intent to do so.80 Although not
absolving ‘innocents’ from liability, drafters minimized the impact by
imposing ‘copyright formalities’ that required notice to appear on copies,
a copy of the work to be deposited with the relevant entity, and registration
of the work in a centralized repository.81 The goal was to lower the risk of
innocent infringement.82 Drafters had made the legislative intent clear:
because copyright protection presented serious risk of imposing liability
on those who had infringed unknowingly, potential infringers needed some
simple way to determine whether the book they sought to reprint was protected
by copyright.83
1. 1790-1976
Congress enacted the first version of United States Copyright Act in
1790.84 Like England’s Statute of Anne, the United States’ first Copyright
Act was similarly intended to safeguard innocent infringers.85 The
drafters were concerned that the intangible nature of intellectual property
made inadvertent infringement a greater risk than existed in the tangible
goods context.86 The breadth of exclusive rights and scope of copyright
subject matter at the time was significantly narrower than copyright in its
current form.87 Early copyright law made it easier for users to determine,
ex ante, whether a work was protected—which at that time meant registered
and published—and also whether its use might constitute an infringement.88
Still, the concern about the attendant liability risks to end users was significant
enough for Congress to protect unwitting users from the dangers of infringing

80. Id. at 145–46.
81. H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Symposium, The Untold Story of the First Copyright
Suit Under the Statute of Anne in 1710, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247, 1257–58 (2010);
see also Reese, supra note 1, at 137 (citations omitted).
82. Reese, supra note 1, at 147.
83. Id.
84. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). The 1790 Act protected
books, maps, and charts and provided for an initial term of fourteen years with privilege
of renewal for a term of fourteen years. Id. § 1.
85. Reese, supra note 1, at 149.
86. Id. at 135.
87. Id. at 136 (“Copyright protected a fairly limited universe of authorial works for
most of its early history.”). Accordingly, in the early development of U.S. copyright,
“infringement was likely to be somewhat infrequent, because few works were protected
by copyright.” Id. at 140.
88. Id. at 135.
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inadvertently since the inception of copyright protection in the United
States.89
In 1802, Congress adopted an additional provision that required owners
to provide notice directly on printed copies of the work.90 Although the
precise nature of notice evolved over time, it remained an essential formality
until 1989, when Congress made it permissive rather than mandatory in
order to comply with the Berne Convention.91 Notice, being much more
immediate, proved more effective than registration in ensuring that “none
could offend ignorantly.”92 Although recordation of ownership interests
could give constructive notice to would-be users, copyright information
printed directly on copies sold served as actual notice of the same. Therefore,
one could be reasonably certain that a user received actual notice, which
rendered moot an innocent infringement claim.
Under the 1909 Act, the remedies available to a copyright owner were
limited against a person who exploited a work believing it to be in the public
domain and who unknowingly infringed the copyright.93 The innocent
infringer was liable for profits from the infringement, but they would not
have to pay a copyright owner who accidentally or mistakenly omitted
copyright notice from their work where the infringer was misled by the
omission.94
Congress amended the 1909 Act in 1912 to extend copyright protection
to motion pictures.95 In that same amendment, Congress limited a copyright
owner to statutory damages—in lieu of actual damages—against an infringer
who made a motion picture of the copyrighted work in cases “where the
infringer can show that he was not aware that he was infringing, and that
such infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen [.]”96 The
maximum damages allowed for innocent infringement of motion pictures
of undramatized or nondramatic works was set at $100.97

89. Id. at 159 (“Despite the lack of attention to the issue in the few reported cases
that involved it, the statutory language is clear in requiring knowledge on the [infringer’s]
part from 1790 to 1909.”).
90. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36 § 1, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed 1831).
91. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102
Stat. 2853, 2857 (1988).
92. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802.
93. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 28, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
94. Copyright Act of 1909 § 20.
95. See Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488 (1912) (repealed 1976).
96. Act of Aug. 24, 1912 §§ 5(1), 5(m), 25(b) (emphasis added).
97. Id. § 25(b).
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The total effect of pre-1976 copyright registration and notice formalities
made it far easier for a potential user of a copyrighted work to determine,
with a greater likelihood of success, whether a work was protected. And,
assuming the work was protected, these formalities also made it easier to
determine whether an anticipated unauthorized use might be fair. This led
to, at least, constructive notice of copyright protection in the vast majority
of cases when a plaintiff satisfied the formalities.
In cases where a potential user may have had difficulty determining
whether a use was lawful, courts often looked to a defendant’s knowledge
or intent to avoid imposing liability on someone who did not know their
use was infringing and who would not have discovered their misperception
by reasonable investigation.98 From the very inception of American copyright
jurisprudence, then, the framework included various mechanisms to avoid
holding users liable for infringement when they were not aware of the
rights or, assuming they knew rights existed, did not know or have reason
to know their use constituted an infringement.
2. The 1976 Act
With an eye toward substantive reform of copyright law, Congress
engaged in a series of studies beginning in 1955.99 These studies led to
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976.100 Prior to passage of the 1976
Act, the Register of Copyright issued a report that contained numerous
recommendations, including a recommendation to give courts discretion
to impose fines for innocent infringement.101 The report stated in pertinent
part:
The basic principle that an innocent infringer is liable, except where he has been
misled through some act or omission of the copyright owner, is firmly established
in the copyright law. As between an innocent copyright owner and an innocent
infringer, it has generally been agreed that the loss caused by the infringement
should be borne by the latter. The question is not whether innocent infringers should
be liable; it is whether they should be subject to some minimum amount of damages
and, if so, what the minimum should be.102

98. See, e.g., Ins. Press v. Ford Motor Co., 255 F. 896 (2d Cir. 1918); Altman v. New
Haven Union Co., 254 F. 113 (D. Conn. 1918).
99. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON
THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (July 1961), http://www.copyright.
gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JQC-Y6DV].
100. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
101. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 99, at 104 (“[W]here an infringer establishes
his innocence, the statutory minimum is not mandatory but the court, in its discretion, may
award statutory damages in any amount it deems just.”).
102. Id.
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Generally, courts award statutory damages to deter infringement and to
compensate the copyright owner for the economic harm.103 Nevertheless,
deterrence is not at issue where a user neither knew nor should have known
that their use was infringing.104 Accordingly, the sole purpose of copyright
damages awards in innocent infringement cases is to compensate the copyright
owner.105
The innocent infringer defense, as codified in Section 504 of the Copyright
Act, is not actually a defense to liability; rather, copyright defendants assert
it to mitigate damages in infringement actions after liability has already
been established.106 More specifically, the defendant claims ignorance of
the law or a good faith belief that defendant’s use was fair in order to
appeal to the court’s discretion to award minimal damages.107 Defendants
have the burden of establishing that they were “not aware and had no reason
to believe that . . . [their acts] constituted an infringement of copyright[.]”108
Courts have noted that this burden is a heavy one requiring more than mere
proof that the defendant’s actions were not a willful disregard of the law.109
Infringers can establish their “innocence” and therefore demonstrate
that they qualify for the discretionary minimum by meeting a two-pronged
test: (1) a subjective good- faith belief that their use was permissible,
which; (2) was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.110 A court
looks to various factors to assess whether a defendant’s infringement may

103. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. George Moore Enter., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 166 (W.D.
Pa. 2016) (“Statutory damages serve the dual purposes of compensation and deterrence:
they compensate the plaintiff for the infringement of its copyrights; and they deter future
infringements by punishing the defendant for its actions.” (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Spring Mount Area Bavarian Resort, Ltd., 555 F. Supp. 2d 537, 544 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (internal
quotations omitted)).
104. Id. (“[W]e would provide that where an infringer establishes his innocence, the
statutory minimum is not mandatory but the court, in its discretion, may award statutory
damages in any amount it deems just.”).
105. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 99, at 104.
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012).
107. Id.
108. D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 35–36 (2d Cir. 1990).
109. Id. at 35.
110. Childress v. Taylor, 798 F. Supp. 981, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[A] defendant is
entitled to such reduced minimum only if he proves not only that his infringing conduct
was made in a good faith belief of the innocence of his conduct, but also that he was reasonable
in holding such good faith belief.”) (citation omitted).
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be deemed innocent for purposes of Section 504(c), including whether the
infringed work contained a copyright notice.111
The absence of notice without more is generally not sufficient to establish
innocent infringement in cases where the reasonable person should know
the goods were protected by copyright—constructive notice.112 Judges also
consider the business sophistication of the defendants.113 In those cases,
courts have found innocent infringement where the defendants were deemed
to lack sufficient business acumen to trigger an inquiry into the source of
infringing goods.114 Ultimately, then, courts are required to assess a defendant’s
state of mind to determine what the defendant knew or should have known,
and then decide whether the action was reasonable on a case-by-case basis.115
III. USER CONCERNS: ACCESS, RESPONSIBILITY & RISK
A. Access Fences Dramatically Reduced
The Internet and digital technology have dramatically reduced the traditional
barriers to large-scale access that once stood between copyright users and
creators.116 Technological advancements have also lowered production and
distribution costs of copyrighted content and made it far easier for users

111. See, e.g., Jobete Music Co. v. Johnson Comm’ns, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1077,
1086 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (“In determining the amount of [statutory] damages to be awarded,
courts generally consider (1) the infringer’s blameworthiness, i.e., whether the infringement was
willful, knowing, or innocent, (2) the expenses saved and the profits reaped by the defendants
in connection with the infringement, and (3) the revenues lost by the plaintiffs due to the
defendants’ conduct.”); Odegard, Inc. v. Classic Carpets, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1328, 1340
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Relevant factors in determining the amount of statutory damages include the
expenses saved and profits reaped by the defendants in connection with the infringements,
the revenues lost by the plaintiffs as a result of the defendant’s conduct and the infringers’
state of mind.”) (citation omitted).
112. L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir.
1998) (affirming the district court’s finding that infringement was not innocent based on
the fact that the presence of logo on a video “indicate[d] that the portion of the tape belonged to
someone . . and ‘could . . . lead a reasonable person to inquire whether copying the feed
would infringe a copyright . . . .’”) (citation omitted).
113. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35–36 (citing Warner Bros. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc.,
877 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1989)).
114. Id. at 35.
115. Id.
116. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) (“The
digital age provides a technological infrastructure that greatly expands the possibilities for
individual participation in the growth and spread of culture and thus greatly expands the
possibilities for the realization of a truly democratic culture.”).
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to access protected materials and to innovate further by repurposing or
remixing existing content to create something new.117
The data on past, present, and future use is telling. Internet traffic, users,
and numbers of smart devices have and will continue to grow exponentially.118
A recent white paper from Cisco Visual Networking Index made the following
observations and predictions:
 Global IP119 traffic “will increase nearly threefold over the
next five years, and will have increased nearly a hundredfold
from 2005 to 2020.”120
 “IP traffic will grow at a compound annual growth rate of
[twenty-two percent] from 2015 to 2020.”121
 Global Internet traffic in 2020 will equal ninety-five times
the volume of the entire global Internet in 2005. 122
 “Globally, Internet traffic will reach 21 gigabytes per capita
by 2020, up from 7 gigabytes per capita in 2015.”123
Cisco also predicts that broadband technology will necessarily continue
to develop at astronomical rates to account for and accommodate consumer
demand and use.124

117. Id. at 13 (explaining that digital technology “makes it possible for more and
more people to participate in the creation and distribution of new forms of public discourse,
new forms of art, and new expressions of creativity.”). Of course, these advances benefit
businesses as well by creating new markets for media products produced and/or distributed
in digital formats. Id. The other side of this proverbial coin is that users can also now
infringe on a massive scale with relatively little effort too.
118. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
119. IP, short for Internet Protocol, is defined as “the principal set (or communications
protocol) of digital message formats and rules for exchanging messages between computers
across a single network or a series of interconnected networks[.]” Internet Protocol (IP),
TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/5366/internet-protocol-ip [https://perma.cc/
FY4T-NR5H] (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
120. CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND METHODOLOGY,
2015–2020, at 2 (June 1, 2016), http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/collateral/
service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/complete-white-paper-c11-481360.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2YAP-DTZE].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (“Broadband speeds will nearly double by 2020. By 2020, global fixed broadband
speeds will reach 47.7 Mbps, up from 24.7 Mbps in 2015.”).
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Wi-Fi125 connectivity is already ubiquitous, and the predicted hyperconnectivity of the future will forever change the methods of access as well.
For example, Cisco predicts that “Smartphone traffic will exceed PC traffic
by 2020.”126 As PC-originated traffic growth slows considerably in the coming
years, Cisco forecasts that connected devices—namely “TVs, tablets,
smartphones, and machine-to-machine (M2M) modules—will have traffic
growth rates of seventeen percent, thirty-nine percent, fifty-eight percent,
and forty-four percent, respectively.”127 A final staggering prediction? In
just a few short years, the “number of devices connected to IP networks is
forecasted to be three times as high as the global population in 2020.”128
To be sure, a curious, tense, and tenuous relationship exists at the nexus
of copyright, creative expression, and the economy.129
B. Responsibility: Ex Ante Determinations Prove Precarious
Other than the technological advances discussed above, the greatest
transformational influence on copyright law in the late twentieth and
twenty-first centuries “has come from the unorganized, informal practices
of various, unrelated users of copyrighted works, many of whom probably
know next to nothing about copyright law.”130 Uncertainties in the law,
especially in the online context, lead users to create their own informal
norms and practices.131 Therefore, two worlds of copyright exist: one with
125. Wi-Fi is a short-hand descriptor of “ . . . wireless networking technology that
uses radio waves to provide high-speed network and Internet connections.” Wi-Fi Definition:
What is Wi-Fi, WEBOPEDIA (July 14, 2010), http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/
Computer_Science/wifi_explained.asp [https://perma.cc/QE5P-UWWU].
126. CISCO, supra note 120, at 2. The Cisco White Paper notes further that “[i]n
2015, PCs accounted for 53 percent of total IP traffic, but by 2020 PCs will account for
only 29 percent of traffic. Smartphones will account for 30 percent of total IP traffic in
2020, up from 8 percent in 2015.” Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2. Note that, as of October 16, 2016, the Global population was estimated
at 7,456,883,642. Current World Population (ranked), GEOHIVE, http://www.geohive.com/
earth/population_now.aspx [https://perma.cc/DQE2-7D8J] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017); see
also U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
popclock/world [https://perma.cc/6VCH-9DHN] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017) (providing a
running estimate of the global population).
129. See Houweling, supra note 39, at 1537. Professor Van Houweling explores the
increased costs to users who incorporate existing copyrighted works into their own, such
as documentary filmmakers. She explains: “[t]he expense of building on the works of others is
justified in copyright theory by the hope that the burden copyright imposes on creativity
is outweighed by its benefits.” Id.
130. Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1459, 1460 (referring to the impact of “Web 2.0” and the remix culture of user-generated
content, also known as UGC).
131. See id. at 1468 (noting that “the systemic uncertainties in formal copyright law
do produce their own kind of informal practices.”). Professor Lee explains further that
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formal laws and licensing regimes, and another with informal norms, customs,
and practices.132 Despite the hundreds of pages and dozens of amendments
to the Act since 1976, formal copyright law has many gaps.133 Professor
Edward Lee suggests various reasons for these gaps, including the reality
that so few copyright cases are ever fully litigated to judgment,134 and the
fact that copyright has many grey areas.135
C. Risk
The average user has virtually unfettered access to copyrighted works
online.136 With access comes great responsibility. Users are responsible
for deciding—before saving a blog post, creating and sharing a meme or
gif, creating a mashup or remix, or downloading and disseminating a
copyrighted work for an educational purpose—whether the unauthorized
use is nonetheless fair. The risk of infringement in the twenty-first century
is high.137 Moreover, the financial and other consequences of infringement
can be staggering.138
Absent copyright formalities, and with users’ misguided but firmly
entrenched expectations about permissible uses of copyrighted works, it
“[g]iven the lack of clear rules for fair use and misappropriation, knowledge of copyright
law is often no better than ignorance of copyright law.” Id. The strict liability nature of
copyright supports this observation wholeheartedly.
132. Id. at 1470. Professor Lee describes formal practices as those either authorized
by the copyright holder or legally permitted or excused. Id. To the contrary, informal
practices involve uses that are not expressly affirmed by either the copyright holder or the
court of law. Professor Lee considers implied licenses as an informal practice. Id. at 1472.
He goes on to explain:
[i]nformal copyright practices occur routinely every day. Indeed, it is probably
fair to surmise that the total number of informal copyright practices dwarfs the
total number of formal copyright practices in the United States. In other words,
far more people make far more unlicensed uses of copyrighted works than
licensed or formally authorized uses.
Id.
133. Id. at 1476.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1479 (explaining that copyright’s grey areas apply to uncertainties regarding
how a court would treat a particular use).
136. See Copyright Facts, UNIV. OF COLO. BOULDER, http://www.colorado.edu/libraries/
copyright-information/copyright-facts [https://perma.cc/RA9L-NRTS] (last visited Feb. 21,
2017).
137. See Ten Common Misconceptions About Copyright and Fair Use, VORYS (Oct. 28,
2013), http://www.vorys.com/publications-1143.html [https://perma.cc/X6AF-D6TV].
138. See supra Part II.
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is now easier than ever to make an accidental or mea culpa use of a
copyrighted work. Moreover, because fair use determinations are highly
fact-specific—to the extent cases are even litigated—the good-faith but
mistaken user is often lulled into a false sense of security about the legal
status of the use.139
The consequence of an incorrect determination is to be held strictly liable
for copyright infringement.140 And if a physical copy exists of the work at
issue, then the unwitting user is subject to ordinary damages ranging from
$750 to $30,000.141 That user would not qualify for reduced innocent infringer
damages of $200 because they are deemed to have at least constructive
notice of the copyright holder’s claim of rights.142 For these reasons, I argue
that even with notice, accidental and mea culpa users should only be liable
for minimal damages.
IV. USER ACTIVITIES THAT COULD TRIGGER A REDUCED
DAMAGES AWARD
On any given day, even the most well-intentioned Internet user commits
innumerable technical copyright infringements.143 Professor John Tehranian
proffers an example in the form of a hypothetical user, a law professor
who easily racks up millions in potential liability with every day, wellintentioned activities on the Internet.144
For example, it is common practice to choose an e-mail setting that
automatically reproduces the text of a sender’s email in a reply or to

139. See Lee, supra note 130, at 1480 (explaining that “fair use can act almost as a
trap, dangling the lure of protection from lawsuits if one makes a more ‘transformative’
use—which is exactly the same kind of use that can also constitute an infringing derivative
work.” (citing Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997)).
140. See supra Part II.A.
141. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012).
142. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012).
143. Tehranian, supra note 6, at 543 (noting that “[w]e are, technically speaking, a
nation of constant infringers.”); see also JOE KARAGANIS & LENNART RENKEMA, COPY
CULTURE IN THE US AND GERMANY 3 (2013), http://americanassembly.org/sites/default/
files/download/publication/copy_culture.pdf [https://perma.cc/77GF-RG29]. The study notes
that unauthorized copying is widely practiced and “tracks strongly with youth” but rarely
involves large scale pirates. Id. at 5. Further, it documents how legal streaming services
“displace some informal copying and downloading,” differences in support for penalties
for unauthorized use—narrow majority support in the US, but mixed support in Germany—
and differences in the digital media market and legal frameworks. Id. at 6–7, 11, 25. The
study’s findings were cited by several scholars from 2011 to 2012, during debates over the
Stop Online Piracy Act. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND
THE NETWORKED PUBLIC SPHERE: MAPPING THE SOPA-PIPA DEBATE 29 (2013).
144. Tehranian, supra note 6, at 543–47.
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simply to forward someone’s e-mail.145 Yet, both of these practices violate
the drafter’s reproduction or distribution right in the original e-mail.146
And if twenty recipients of the forwarded e-mail then reply to the e-mail,
forward it, or both, the original copyist could be, due to the strict liability
nature of copyright, liable for infringement and responsible for anywhere
from $15,000 to $600,000 for merely ordinary infringement.147
Another common activity is downloading, printing, and sharing copies
of a copyrighted work available online. Tehranian’s hypothetical professor
does just that by distributing copies to his students.148 Such activity would
likely exceed the bounds of fair use exceptions for education; this use would
trigger copyright liability as well.149
Users could also be liable for violating public performance and distribution
rights if they record their performance of someone else’s poem or song
and post it online via YouTube or Soundcloud,150 or liable if they copy an
online image, add text to create a meme151 or gif,152 and post it to Twitter,153

145. Id. at 543 (noting that, “[e]ach unauthorized reproduction of someone else’s
copyrighted text—their email—represents a separate act of brazen infringement.”).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1)–(2) (2012).
147. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012). This range of damages assumes that the actor
would be considered an “ordinary” infringer and not a willful infringer. In the latter
case, statutory damages could total three million dollars. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
148. Tehranian, supra note 6, at 544.
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)–(2).
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
151. The term “meme” is defined as, “an idea, behavior, style, or usage that spreads
from person to person within a culture.” Meme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/meme [https://perma.cc/MW2A-KDGL] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
152. The term “GIF” is defined as, “a computer file format for the compression and
storage of digital video images; also: such an image itself.” GIF, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/GIF [https://perma.cc/43C5-V2H4] (last visited Feb.
22, 2017).
153. Twitter, as stated on their webpage, is best described as follows:
Twitter is a service for friends, family, and coworkers to communicate and stay
connected through the exchange of quick, frequent messages. People post Tweets,
which may contain photos, videos, links and up to 140 characters of text. These
messages are posted to your profile, sent to your followers[], and are searchable
on Twitter search.
New User FAQs, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/13920 [https://perma.cc/
F578-F3PR] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
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Instagram,154 or Snapchat.155 All of these activities are commonplace user
activities conducted generally in a noncommercial way. Yet, all are technical
copyright infringements of either the accidental or mea culpa variety.
Absent a fair use defense, and assuming the copyright owners preserved
the right to avail themselves of statutory damages and decide to enforce
their copyrights, the user would be liable for infringement and subject to
at least ordinary and perhaps even willful statutory damages.156 In no case
would any of these described users qualify for reduced innocent infringer
damages under current law.
In Safe Harbor, I described the types of uses and users I think can and
should benefit from a mandatory reduced damages minimum provision.157
I explained that the Internet and digital technology provide countless new
and novel ways to create and disseminate information and creative endeavors
that, when original and fixed in a tangible medium of expression, are protected
by copyright.158 Many are digital creations involving collaborative and
cumulative methods of transforming what already exists into something
new.159 Today’s user is not merely a consumer, but often a republisher or
even an add-on—aka second-generation—creator of UGC.160 From copying
and pasting, to sharing, to creating and disseminating memes or gifs created
from preexisting copyrighted works, to blog posts that may incorporate
pre-existing work and also include new material in the form of commentary
or critique, users often turn their consumption into a creative endeavor.
Much of social networking encourages and depends on this behavior for

154. Instagram, as stated on their webpage, is best described as follows:
Instagram is a fun and quirky way to share your life with friends through a series
of pictures. Snap a photo with your mobile phone, then choose a filter to transform
the image into a memory to keep around forever. We’re building Instagram to
allow you to experience moments in your friends’ lives through pictures as they
happen. We imagine a world more connected through photos.
FAQ, INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/about/faq/ [https://perma.cc/E2CE-S2SB]
(last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
155. Snapchat, on their website, briefly describes their app as being “about sharing
moments and having fun.” Snapchat Support, SNAPCHAT, https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/
a/guidelines (last visited Feb. 22, 2017). Further definition may be found on the webpage
of Verizon Wireless, which describes the app as one that “lets you share images or video
clips to your friends. But there’s a twist: [t]hey can only be viewed for a matter of seconds.”
Snapchat 101: What It Is and How To Use It, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://www.verizonwireless.
com/archive/mobile-living/tech-smarts/what-is-snapchat-how-to-use-new-features/ [https://
perma.cc/F96M-3YTR] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
156. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)–(2) (2012).
157. See Evans, supra note 1, at 32.
158. Id. at 9.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 15.
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the network to thrive.161 In fact, most websites invite their visitors to republish
and comment on content hosted on their sites with the all-too-familiar social
plug-in invitation to share.162
Madhavi Sunder describes the impact of the proliferation of noncommercial
UGC, which includes mashups,163 fan fiction,164 and machinima,165 as “. . .
explosive creativity shared among millions on the Internet.”166 Professor
Sunder notes that such noncommercial UGC challenges the economic
incentive rationale of the copyright monopoly.167 Consumer-creators create
and distribute “hordes” of content not only without the promise of copyright
protections, but in defiance of them.168 Digital natives, in particular, grew
up in a time of ubiquitous sharing, where every child in little league and
pee wee soccer got a trophy—thus further solidifying a profound sense of
community.169
But what happens when a user accesses, repurposes, or republishes a
copyrighted work online when the website owner does not actually have
the right to grant permission to use it? For example, a site owner may

161. See, e.g., Molly Schuetz, Facebook Explores Revenue Share Models in Content
Push, BLOOMBERG (June 1, 2016, 6:24 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-06-01/instagram-is-exploring-revenue-sharing-models-in-content-push [https://perma.cc/
3WK2-EJD9].
162. See Evans, supra note 1, at 9 (citation omitted). Although one might argue that
implied licenses apply in the social networking environment, such is not the case when
the infringing sharer did not have the authority to copy, adapt, publicly display, or disseminate
a protected work.
163. The term “mashup” is defined as “something created by combining elements from
two or more sources,” and the definition goes on to specifically reference online sources
in subpart (c). Mash-up, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
mash–up [https://perma.cc/59WF-VMUV] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
164. The term “fan fiction” is defined as, “stories involving popular fictional characters
that are written by fans and often posted on the Internet.” Fan Fiction, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fan%20fiction [https://perma.cc/U6WT-29A7]
(last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
165. The Urban Dictionary defines machinima as, “[t]he art of using a pre-rendered
gaming engine and making it into a film. The word is derived from: Machine and Cinema.”
Machinima, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=machinima
[https://perma.cc/WA9A-RUSY] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
166. Sunder, supra note 7, at 303.
167. See id. at 307–09.
168. Id. at 303.
169. See Ashley Merryman, Losing Is Good for You, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/opinion/losing-is-good-for-you.html?_r=0 (stating that
“participation trophies and prizes are almost a given, as children are constantly assured that they
are winners.”).
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have the legal right to make use of a copy but not to create additional
copies, electronically or otherwise, or to adapt, publicly display or distribute
copies to others—rights that the copyright owner holds. Therefore, each time
a user clicks share, reposts a status or image via Facebook or via a Web
site, or retweets a tweet via Twitter, for example, the potential for copyright
infringement exists.170
A. User Rights
Users of copyrighted works are not a homogenous group.171 Some users
are purely consumers.172 Others are intermediate users, and still others
are second-generation creators. And, because copyright law is not a total
prohibition on all use or access, and applies only to the exclusive Section
106 rights, users have rights too.173 However, user rights are neither
expressly proclaimed nor staunchly protected in the text of the Act or its
interpretation.174
David Vaver notes that if user rights were truly on par with owner
rights, the latter would be enforced only in certain “special cases” that
appreciably encourage creative production and that do so in a way that
does not “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of users.”175 The
WIPO Copyright Treaty,176 for example, describes creators’ benefits as

170. See The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 940533, § 106, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
171. Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay: Copyright and Intermediate Users’ Rights, 23 COLUM. 
VLA J.L. & ARTS 67, 67 (1999) (explaining that user rights are present in several different
guises).
172. Id. (describing “consumptive” users who focus on personal enjoyment and convenience
through private copying).
173. See The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 940533, § 106, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
174. See id. Some recent fair use cases, however, have pushed fair use analysis in a
positive direction for users, especially second-generation creators. See e.g., Lenz v. Universal
Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (the “Dancing Baby” case in which the court
held that copyright holders must consider whether the potentially infringing material is a
fair use of a copyright under before issuing a takedown notice); Authors Guild v. Google,
Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that making of a digital copy to provide a search
function is a transformative use); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding
that most of artist’s paintings were sufficiently transformative to constitute a fair use).
175. See David Vaver, Copyright and the Internet: From Owner Rights and User
Duties to User Rights and Owner Duties?, 57 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 731, 736 (2007)
(examining and critiquing international treaties and conventions to note they portend to
inject balance in the law but, in fact, fail to adequately articulate or protect user rights).
176. The WIPO Copyright Treaty is “a special agreement under the Berne Convention
which deals with the protection of works and the rights of their authors in the digital
environment.” WIPO Copyright Treaty, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ip/wct/ [https://perma.cc/BG67-KNSE] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
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rights and describes user activities as limitations or exceptions to those
rights rather than countervailing rights in and to themselves.177
However, Canada’s highest court has held that users hold actual rights,
not just limitations on the rights of copyright holders.178 Any rights not
exclusively granted to owners are deemed user rights.179 The Supreme Court
of Canada refused to read fair dealing as an exception to an owner’s copyright
and, instead, read it as a user right.180 Writing for a unanimous court, the
Chief Justice explained:
[T]he fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly understood as an integral
part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence. Any act falling within the
fair dealing exception will not be an infringement of copyright. The fair dealing
exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right. In order
to maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner and users’
interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively.181

Canada’s approach to, and interpretation of, uses of copyrighted works
deemed “fair” as a user right proves illustrative of United States’ copyright
jurisprudence. The approach to uses deemed “fair” in the United States is,
however, treated as an affirmative defense after liability has been established
due to the strict liability nature of copyright.182 If fair use remains an
affirmative defense in the United States, as first articulated in Folsom v.
Marsh183 and, ultimately, as codified in 1976, it is unlikely that Congress
would categorize fair use as a user right. But it should.
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court referred back to Harper
& Row in noting that Congress had previously resisted attempts to create
presumptive categories of fair use.184 Congress had encouraged courts to
177. See Vaver, supra note 175, at 747.
178. See id. at 748 (citing Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. CCH Canadian Ltd., [2004]
1 S.C.R. 339, 364–65 (Can.)).
179. See Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 364.
180. See Vaver, supra note 175, at 748 (citing Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at
364).
181. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 364.
182. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). But see Lenz v.
Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that “[f]air use is
not just excused by the law, it is wholly authorized by the law.”).
183. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
184. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). The
Supreme Court, in rejecting a rigid view of separate categories of copyright infringement,
stated the following:
The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis. The text employs the terms
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maintain a broad, ample view of the “universe of relevant evidence.”185
Given the overall intent of Congress in enacting the 1976 Act to broadly and
liberally construe copyright law, it makes sense that the fair use defense
should be read and interpreted in that light. However, as society’s view
of preferred and beneficial uses changes with the times, so too must the
law if it is to have any weight and meaning.186
Historically, the fair use doctrine served as the primary means to protect
copyright user rights.187 Congress contemplated that, in exchange for exclusive
rights, owners granted an implied license to make certain unauthorized but
socially beneficial uses. This “quid pro quo” exchange is intended to balance
an owner’s copyright monopoly with a user’s First Amendment or other
rights.188
Fair use should, in theory, protect the vital space provided by the First
Amendment as well as other socially beneficial uses.189 In practice, however,
it has generally been inadequate, at best, and difficult for courts to apply
consistently.190 This rings true particularly in the digital landscape when
judges must master not only the dense complexities of copyright but also
the nuances of technology. Because the form and substance of copyright

“including” and “such as” in the preamble paragraph to indicate the “illustrative and
not limitative” function of the examples given, which thus provide only general
guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly
had found to be fair uses. Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation,
one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light
of the purposes of copyright.
Id. at 577–78 (internal citations omitted); see also Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539 (1985).
185. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 584.
186. See generally Lee, supra note 130, at 1464 (noting that because copyright law
is profoundly ambiguous, “informal copyright practices are vital to the functioning of the
entire copyright system.”).
187. Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 91, 91 (2010) (explaining that “[i]n the current digital media environment . . . the
uncertainty that shrouds fair use and the proliferation of technological protection measures
undermine the doctrine and its role in copyright policy.”). The Fair Use Doctrine is codified at
Section 107 of the Copyright Act.
188. Amanda Reid, Claiming the Copyright, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 428 (2016).
189. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 577. The Court in Acuff-Rose explained further:
“[t]he fair use doctrine thus ‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
designed to foster.’” (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
190. See John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and
an Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1215–16. See also Alex Kozinski
& Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 513,
514 (1999). But see Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537
(2009) (arguing that “copyright fair use case law is more coherent and more predictable
than many commentators seem to believe”).
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laws have, until recently,191 been defined by the lobbying efforts of powerful
corporations in the business of acquiring and disseminating copyrighted
material, the law has developed to vociferously protect those stakeholders.192
I assert that this hyper-protectionism has occurred at the expense of protecting
uses deemed fair and the public domain at-large.
Users also have the right to be protected against copyright misuse. Misuse
is best understood as a doctrine based on the theory of unclean hands and
prevents a copyright holder from asserting a copyright claim as a result.193
B. Canadian Copyright Modernization Act
On June 29, 2012, the Canadian Parliament passed Canada’s Copyright
Modernization Act (Bill C11) and the bill received Royal Assent on the same
day.194 Bill C11 was Parliament’s first successful attempt to reconcile
legislatively the competing policy interests of user rights and creator rights in
the digital age and to bring its laws in line with international standards.195
Prior to its enactment, some were concerned about the potential countervailing

191. What was eventually deemed the largest online protest in history occurred on
January 18, 2012, and involved SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) in the House of Representatives
and PIPA (Protect Intellectual Property Act) in the Senate; opponents of the bills and user
rights advocates with deep pockets joined forces to defeat what they referred to as the
“internet censorship” bills. Two days later on January 20, Congress pulled the bills indefinitely.
See SOPA Petition Gets Millions of Signatures as Internet Piracy Legislation Protests Continue,
WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sopa
petition-gets-millions-of-signatures-as-internet-piracy-legislation-protests-continue/2012/01/19/
gIQAHaAyBQ_story.html [https://perma.cc/JC9F-N62V]; see also Victory!, SOPASTRIKE,
http://www.sopastrike.com/ [https://perma.cc/6ABT-FGX6] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
192. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (Prometheus Books 2006);
Lee, supra note 131, at 1466 (explaining that “[m]any of the provisions of the Copyright
Act were drafted by interested (primarily industry) stakeholders, who were in some sense
creating new customs or incorporating existing customs; indeed, many of the exemptions
to copyright in Sections 108 to 122 of the Copyright Act have the look and feel of a market
practice or custom.” (citing Litman, supra note 66, at 23)).
193. See Lee, supra note 131, at 1466–67 (first citing Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v.
Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997); then citing DSC Commc’ns Corp. v.
DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); and then citing Lasercomb Am., Inc.
v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977–79 (4th Cir. 1990)).
194. Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c.20 (Can.).
195. See Margot E. Patterson & Emma Williamson, Canada: The Copyright Modernization
Act: Canada’s New Rights and Rules, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/187084/
Copyright/The+Copyright+Modernization+Act+Canadas+New+Rights+And+Rules [https://
perma.cc/UU5P-BLCQ] (last updated July 18, 2012).
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and nullifying impact of the technological protections measures (TPMs)196
also proposed in C11.197
The amendment involves TPMs, user-generated content (UGC),198 private
copying by for purposes of time-shifting and medium-shifting, expanded
fair dealing provisions,199 and reduced statutory damages awards in the case
of infringement claims involving private, non-TPM related uses.200
The provisions and legislative intent are summarized as follows:
This enactment amends the Copyright Act to (a) update the rights and protections
of copyright owners to better address the challenges and opportunities of the
Internet, so as to be in line with international standards; (b) clarify Internet service
providers’ liability and make the enabling of online copyright infringement itself
an infringement of copyright; (c) permit businesses, educators and libraries to make
greater use of copyright material in digital form; (d) allow educators and students
to make greater use of copyright material; (e) permit certain uses of copyright material
by consumers; (f) give photographers the same rights as other creators; (g) ensure
that it remains technologically neutral; and (h) mandate its review by Parliament
every five years.201

196. TPMs, also referred to as digital locks, are used to prevent both unauthorized access
to and unauthorized copying of copyrighted works. See Fred von Lohmann, Measuring
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against the Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of
Technological Protection Measures, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 635, 635 (2004).
197. See Dwayne Winseck, Take Notice of the Slippery Slopes in the Copyright
Modernization Act, GLOBE &MAIL (Oct. 25, 2011, 12:04 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
technology/digital-culture/take-notice-of-the-slippery-slopes-in-the-copyright-modernization-act/
article542674/ [https://perma.cc/HU78-UTD9] (noting that the biggest issues with C-11
may be that the new user rights might be trumped by the digital locks provisions, which
prevent access and copying, and draws attention to the notice rules that require ISPs to notify
copyright holders of alleged violations and to maintain records of allegedly infringing
activities); see also Althia Raj, Bill C-11: Copyright Legislation and Digital Lock Provisions
Face Opposition In Canada, HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (June 17, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.ca/2012/06/17/bill-c-11-copyright-modernization-act-canada_n_1603837.html
[https://perma.cc/AGL9-N57W]; Daniel Tencer, ‘Notice and Notice’ System Will Mean ISPs
Tracking Subscribers, HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (Oct. 15, 2:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
ca/2013/10/15/copyright-law-canada-track-users_n_4101406.html [https://perma.cc/C8PA
DVJ2] (discussing the requirement in the CMA for ISPs to retain information on the
accused subscriber for a minimum of six months).
198. See Patterson & Williamson, supra note 195.
199. Canada’s fair dealing provisions are analogous to the fair use provisions in the
United States codified at 17 U.S.C §107. See Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c C-42 (Can.).
200. This is analogous to the innocent infringer damage reductions codified at 504(c)
and consistent with the intention of my proposed amendment to that section. Under the
CMA, if a judge is convinced the defendant “had no reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant had infringed copyright, the court may reduce the amount of the award . . . to
less than $500, but not less than $200.” Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c.20 (Can.),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ca/ca148en.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD4J-RWVT].
Further, “[t]he court must take proportionality into account in awarding damages for
commercial purposes.” Id.
201. Id.
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Immediately after Bill C11’s passage, stakeholders and commentators
surmised its practical impact.202 Although many parts of the amendment
stirred significant controversy, commentators recognized the bill as a step
in the right direction to reconcile inconsistencies and to provide much-needed
clarity for both user rights and creator rights that are more reflective of
twenty-first century technological realities.203
V. THE DOC’S INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE FINDINGS
In 2010, the United States Department of Commerce (DOC) formed its
Internet Policy Task Force (Task Force) to critically examine privacy policy,
the global-wide flow of information on the Internet, cybersecurity, and the
state of copyright law in the context of technological innovation and the
Internet economy.204 DOC Secretary Penny Pritzker stated that the goal
of the green paper was to ensure “copyright policy provides strong incentives
for creativity, while promoting innovation in the digital economy[.]”205
The Task Force released its findings in a green paper on July 31, 2013
titled Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy
(Green Paper) and touted it as “the most thorough and comprehensive analysis
of digital copyright policy issued by any United States administration since
1995.”206
The Green Paper identified three general areas requiring further
investigation.207 First, the report noted that the Task Force should explore
202. See Patterson & Williamson, supra note 195.
203. Id.; see also Daniel Tencer, Massive Drop in Canadian Online Piracy Under
New Law, Copyright Firm Says, H UFFINGTON P OST C AN . (May 21, 2015, 1:05 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/05/21/online-piracy-canada-ceg-tek_n_7372626.html
[https://perma.cc/MZ2B-ZJM8] (“When Canada enacted its “notice-and-notice” system to
combat unauthorized downloading, many of Hollywood’s biggest copyright holders argued the
new law wasn’t strong enough to stop piracy. But only a few months after the law took
effect, copyright holders are changing their minds—and some are urging the U.S. to adopt
the Canadian system.”).
204. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES,
FIRST SALE, AND STATUTORY DAMAGES 1 (Jan. 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L5A-6YFU] [hereinafter WHITE
PAPER].
205. Id. at 3 (quoting U.S.DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT
POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY ii (July 2013), http://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf [https://perma.
cc/E5LW-ABJ8]).
206. Id. at 1.
207. Id.
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and proffer recommendations regarding the legal framework for the creation
of remixes,208 the relevance and scope of the first sale doctrine in the online
context, and the best way to calibrate unwieldy statutory damages for direct
liability of individual users and secondary liability of mass online service
providers.209 The other findings involved the establishment of a multistakeholder forum to assess ways to improve the DMCA’s notice and
takedown system, and a determination of the government’s ideal role in
improving online licensing of copyrighted works.210
Thereafter, the Task Force solicited comments from the relevant stakeholders—
owners, users, and intermediaries—regarding the Green Paper findings and
focus areas.211 It also held four roundtables in different cities led by over sixty
panelists across the country to discuss the policy issues raised therein.212
Over 750 stakeholders participated in the forums either in person or online.213
Acknowledging the reality that digital technology and the Internet have
changed exponentially the way creators produce and distribute copyrighted
works online, and how consumers access, use, and otherwise interact with
copyrighted content, the Task Force concluded that any effective and balanced
change to copyright law must necessarily work in tandem with the free
flow of information.214 The comments, forums, and assessments culminated
in the Task Force’s 2016 White Paper on Remixes, First Sale, and Statutory
Damages.215 The Task Force asserted its confidence that the assertions and
commendations would, if implemented, “advance copyright policy and ensure
that . . . creative and innovative industries can continue to strengthen [the]
nation’s culture and economy.”216
Congress included the statutory damages framework in the Act because
the economic impact of copyright infringement is often difficult, if not
impossible, to ascertain precisely.217 This is especially true early in the
208. “Remixing” is the process of re-ordering, repurposing, or otherwise incorporating
new material with preexisting copyrighted materials. See Carmit Soliman, Remix Sharing:
Sharing Platforms as a Tool for Advancement of UGC Sharing, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH
279, 281 (2012).
209. WHITE PAPER, supra note 204, at 1.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1–2. For a complete listing of the participants, see Appendix II of the White
Paper. Id. at 104–07.
213. Id. at 2.
214. Id. at 3.
215. Id.
216. Id. at iii.
217. See Damias A. Wilson, Copyright Compilation Conundrum: Modernizing Statutory
Damages Awards for the Digital Marketplace, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1189, 1204–05 (2011).
Incidentally, this is also the reason Congress opted to make copyright infringement a strict
liability offense. Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright,
54 RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 360 (2002) (citing Alan Latman & William S. Tager, Liability
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work’s life cycle when it has not yet been tested in the relevant marketplace.
The Task Force noted that statutory damages have become increasingly
important in cases of online infringement, where the scope of infringing
use may not be ascertainable.218 Thereafter, users expressed strong concern
with the level of statutory damages, inconsistencies in application of the
statutory damages framework, and litigation abuse in the forms of copyright
misuse219 and copyright trolls.220
In response to these user concerns, the Internet Policy Task Force-made
three recommendations to address the concerns presented and to better
balance needs of copyright owners, users, and intermediaries.221 Two of
the recommendations are directly relevant to this Article. First, the IPTF
recommended that Congress: (1) incorporate into the Act a list of factors
for courts and juries to consider when determining the amount of a statutory
damages award;222 and (2) implement changes to notice provisions that would
expand eligibility for the lower “innocent infringement” statutory damages
awards.223

of Innocent Infringers of Copyright, Study No. 25, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 140
(Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. eds., 1963)).
218. WHITE PAPER, supra, note 204, at 5.
219. “Copyright misuse” is defined as a “defense arising from judicial creation, [that]
allows copyright infringers to escape liability when the copyright owner has “misused” the
rights granted under copyright.” Ilan Charnelle, The Justification and Scope of the Copyright
Misuse Doctrine and Its Independence of the Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 167, 167
(2002).
220. See Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U. COLO.
L. REV. 53 (2014). Greenberg notes that term may have different meanings to different
people, but defined it as a copyright owner who does one of the following:
(1) acquires a copyright—either through purchase or act of authorship—for the
primary purpose of pursuing past, present, or future infringement actions; (2)
compensates authors or creates works with an eye to the litigation value of
a work, not the commercial value; (3) lacks a good faith licensing program; and
(4) uses the prospect of statutory damages and litigation expenses to extract
quick settlements of often weak claims.
Id. at 59.
221. WHITE PAPER, supra, note 204, at 5.
222. Id.
223. Id. The white paper also supports creating a streamlined procedure for adjudicating
small claims. Recently, Representatives Hakeem Jeffries and Tom Marino introduced a
bill entitled the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2016 (the
CASE Act). The CASE Act would establish a copyright small claims program—also called
the Copyright Claims Board (CCB)—at the U.S. Copyright Office, consisting of three
appointed claims officers, to serve as an alternative forum in which parties in a copyright
infringement controversy can voluntarily seek to resolve certain copyright claims regarding any
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VI. SECTIONS 504(C)(3) AND 512 RE-IMAGINED
A. Section 504
In 2013, the Register of Copyrights, Maria A. Pallante, delivered the
Horace S. Manges lecture at Columbia Law School.224 In that lecture, she
challenged and encouraged us all—Congress, stakeholders, and commentators
alike—to not just think about copyright and its inevitable evolution in
light of its tension with technology and innovation, but to think big.225 To
that end, we cannot continue to lumber along applying a law that was
outdated almost before it was even enacted. It is now time for Congress
to shed the 1976 Act and engage in a total and substantial overhaul of the
Act.226 Congress should adopt my proposed amendment to the statutory
damages provisions in Section 504. Even with a substantive overhaul of
the Act, Congress would not need to start from scratch; rather, the existing
bricks simply need new mortar.227
In light of the concerns I raised in Safe Harbor, Parts II and III of this
Article, and the shared concerns of OSPs and end-users about unintentional

category of copyrighted work. The Copyright Office would also hire no fewer than two
Copyright Claims Attorneys to assist in the administration of the program. CCB officers
would, after the initial staggered-term appointments, serve for six years, with renewal by
the Librarian of Congress upon recommendation of the Register of Copyrights. See H.R.
5757, 114th Cong. (2016).
224. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315,
344 (2013). On October 21, 2016, Librarian of Congress Dr. Carla Hayden named Karyn
Temple Claggett Acting Register of Copyrights and commended a national search is conducted
for a new permanent Register of Copyrights. U.S. Copyright Office Leadership, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/about/leadership/bio-claggett.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKS9
LF4B] (last revised Nov. 17, 2016).
225. Id. at 344.
226. Id. at 319 (citing Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 YALE L.J. 48, 62
(1926)). Solberg’s words are as true today as they were in 1926 when he expounded, “subject
ought to be dealt with as a whole, and not by further merely partial or temporizing amendments.”
Thorvald Solberg, supra, at 62.
227. Pallante, supra note 224, at 320 (noting that “[t]he next great copyright act would
not require Congress to start from scratch, because it has put in motion a steady stream of
preparatory work on core issues since 1998.”). Congress, through numerous requests from
the Copyright Act, has done a lot of the work necessary to understand the current landscape
and stakeholder concerns in relation to the needs of the future. For example,
Congress has requested that the Copyright Office prepare a number of formal
studies and analyses and conduct public inquiries and roundtables on important
issues. Although none of these were undertaken for the purpose of a comprehensive
revision, they provide Congress with a fair amount of background on issues that
would be relevant to the next great copyright act.
Id. at 321.
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infringement online in our “copy culture,”228 the following proposed statutory
revision seeks to address those concerns and to offer a just, efficient, and
equitable remedy for twenty-first century users and content owners alike.
I would leave intact subsection (2)229 but add an additional subsection
to extend fair use protection beyond non-profits and public broadcasting
entities.
(2)

Except as provided in Section 512 (__),230 in a case where the infringer
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was
not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award
of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.
The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer
believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the
copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was:
(i)

an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or
archives acting within the scope of his or her employment who, or such
institution, library, or archives itself, which infringed by reproducing
the work in copies or phonorecords; or

(ii) a public broadcasting entity which or a person who, as a regular part
of the nonprofit activities of a public broadcasting entity (as defined in
section 118 (f)) infringed by performing a published nondramatic
literary work or by reproducing a transmission program embodying a
performance of such a work; or
(iii) The court shall reduce statutory damages to not more than $200 in any
case where an infringer qualifies for the limited user exception under
§ 512 (_).231

VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the rapid technological and societal changes that have taken
place since 1790, Congress has made only a few substantive overhauls to
the Act. It amended the 1909 Act and created a flexible copyright regime
dynamic enough to keep pace with technology. By the time Congress enacted
the 1976 Act, however, the law already lagged behind. In fact, Pamela

228. KARAGANIS & RENKEMA, supra note 143, at 3 (noting that “copy culture”
is “characterized by the copying, sharing, and downloading of music, movies, TV shows,
and other digital media.”).
229. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 204.
230. See Evans, supra note 1, at 33.
231. See id. at 33–35.
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Samuelson opined that perhaps the public may have been better served if
the 1909 Act had remained in force.232
The 1976 Act was probably doomed from the start. The very technology
the Act was intended to manage was not yet developed enough to give
Congress an inkling of how substantially technology would challenge and
outpace the law.233 Hindsight is 20/20. With forty years of reflection and
dozens of incremental steps toward fixing the ill-fated 1976 Act, Congress
has more than enough information about owner and intermediary concerns
as well as commonplace user activities, especially of the user-as-creator
variety, to engage in a substantive overall of copyright law.234 The next
amendment should include greater protections of users. Congress should
create safe, or at least safer harbors by adopting a more meaningful minimum
statutory damage award under 504(c) for accidental and mea culpa infringers.
It is reasonable, fair, just, and time.

232. See Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 551, 555. Samuelson reasoned that perhaps users would have been better off under
the 1909 Act because “so many more works would be in the public domain and available
for free reuse and creative remixes.” Id. She went on to suggest “that U.S. copyright industries
would have fared just fine had the legislative stasis over new technology issues continued
for another few decades.” Id.
233. See id.
234. Pamela Samuelson asserted this point ten years ago when she wrote:
Thirty years after enactment of the 1976 Act, with the benefit of considerable
experience with computer and other advanced technologies and the rise of amateur
creators, it may finally be possible to formulate a more comprehensive approach
to adapting copyright to digital networked environments and maintaining copyright’s
integrity as to existing industry products and services that do not exist outside
of the digital realm.
Id.; see also Elkin-Koren, supra note 72, at 1538 (noting that copyright was designed for
an analog world and is, therefore, “making a slow and painful transition into the digital era”).
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